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Abstract
We demonstrate that the coexistence of two parallel markets - an uncoordinated search
market and a market with competitive middlemen - can resolve the 'lemons' problem'.
Compared with the search market, middlemen facilitate efficient matching. Low quality
sellers generally prefer trading via middlemen because this practice guarantees trading.
Market failure is avoided if sufficiently many low quality sellers choose the middleman
market. This happens if buyers' valuation for 'lemons' is high enough. We also show that
allowing for subsequent trading opportunities limits the range of parameter values within
which the sufficient separation may exist.
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1 Introduction
Akerlof (1970) demonstrates in his seminal work on adverse selection that when buyers
anticipate the average quality of the goods but cannot verify the quality of any partic-
ular good there may be a market failure. If the sellers? own valuation for the good is
increasing with the quality, it may happen in a static setting that the Walrasian price
is lower than high quality sellers? valuation for the good, so that potentially gainful
trade remains unrealized and there is only market for ?lemons?.
We demonstrate that the coexistence of two parallel markets - an uncoordinated
search market and an intermediated market with competitive middlemen - can resolve
the ?lemons? problem?. Our result stems from the assumption that agents can obtain
transaction through a middleman with greater probability than when trying to search
for a potential trading partner on their own.1 Since the low quality sellers have lower
valuation for their own selling good, they value e¢cient trading more than the sellers of
high quality goods. Akerlo?an market failure is avoided if su¢ciently many low quality
sellers choose to trade through a middleman, so that high quality goods can be traded
in the search market. A su¢cient separation - and even a full separation - is possible
if buyers? valuation for the low quality good is high enough. This guarantees that
su¢ciently many buyers are willing to enter the intermediated market, even though
they rationally expect that there will be only lemons for sale.
The role of middlemen in overcoming the adverse selection problem has been
recognized in some earlier contributions (e.g. Biglaiser, 1993; Li, 1998). However, these
models typically emphasize middlemen as experts who possess a technology for quality
testing and thereby can reveal sellers? private information. Our model demonstrates
that middlemen?s presence can induce separation even without any quality screening2.
It has also been argued (e.g. Janssen and Roy, 2002; Blouin, 2003) that the
Akerlo?an market failure is less likely to occur in a dynamic setting. If high quality
sellers wait for future trading opportunities, their relative share gradually increases,
neutralizing the lemon?s e¤ect. However, we show in the dynamic extension of the
model that subsequent trading opportunities limit - not extent - the range of parameter
values within which the su¢cient separation may occur. This is because future trading
1E.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) and Gehrig (1993) draw on this idea.
2Garella (1989) provides an example where a middleman can successfully resolve Akerlof?s impasse
by randomizing the price o¤ers to the sellers.
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opportunities reduce the expected value loss from the inability to trade, so that the
search market becomes a more attractive option also for the low quality sellers.
2 Static model
Assume a continuum of buyers and sellers of measure one each. The fraction of high
(low) quality sellers is ¸ (1¡¸). High and low quality sellers value their selling goods
for h > 0 and l = 0 respectively. Buyers? valuations are H and L. Buyers know the
quality distribution f¸; 1¡ ¸g but cannot observe the quality of any particular good.
The valuations are ranked as H > h > L > l = 0. In accordance with Akerlof (1970),
we assume
¸H + (1¡ ¸)L < h; (1)
which in Walrasian setting leads to a situation where only low quality goods are traded.
Traders face two options: They can either search for a trading partner or go to
an intermediated market with active middlemen. The search market is characterized
by matching frictions and markets do not typically clear. The middleman market,
however, features perfect matching in a sense that each trader has a frictionless access
to any middleman and can always locate a vacant trading partner.
Since l < h, the opportunity cost of not transacting is higher for the low quality
sellers. They may thus prefer trading in the middleman market because this practice
guarantees trading. Hence, the high quality sellers can only trade in the search market,
while the low quality sellers and all buyers may play mixed strategies between the
search market and the middleman market with the respective probability distributions
fa; 1¡ ag and fb; 1¡ bg. We ?rst conjecture ?su¢cient separation? and then verify
under which parameter values such an equilibrium is feasible.
2.1 Search market
Matching between buyers and sellers in the search market is governed by the ?urn-ball?
process.3 Buyers are ?balls? who come up to sellers (?urns?). The number of buyers
(sellers) in the search market is x = b (y = ¸+ a (1¡ ¸)). For tractability, we assume
large markets, so that the number of buyers a seller expects can be approximated
with a Poisson distribution with parameter x=y ´ Á. The probability that n buyers
3E.g. Butters (1977) and Hall (1979).
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approach a particular seller then yields (Án=n!) e¡Á. 4 Since some sellers may not
meet any buyers while some sellers meet several competing buyers, some agents remain
unmatched.
The expected utility of a buyer entering the search market is denoted by Bs.
The corresponding utilities of high and low quality sellers are denoted by Ssh and S
s
l
respectively. Prices are determined as a bidding game where buyers can observe how
many other buyers are bidding for the same good. With probability e¡Á, only one
buyer approaches the seller and he bids p1. Since we are looking for an equilibrium
where all seller types trade, p1 must equal h which is the high quality seller?s valuation
for his own good. With probability 1¡ e¡Á, there are at least two bidders competing
for the same good. The bidders raise their price o¤ers until driven to they just break-
even; i.e. the highest bid p¸2 equals »H + (1¡ »)L, where » = ¸= (¸+ a (1¡ ¸))
denotes the expected fraction of high quality sellers in the search market. Buyer?s
expected utility is thus given by
Bs = e¡Á (»H + (1¡ »)L ¡ h) : (2)
Sellers are left without any contacts with probability e¡Á, in which case they do
not earn any rents. A single buyer shows up with probability Áe¡Á and both seller types
receive the price p1 = h. At least two buyers come by with probability 1¡ (1 + Á) e¡Á
and the high and low quality sellers earn p¸2 ¡ h and p¸2 ¡ l = p¸2 respectively. The
expected utilities for the high and low quality sellers thus yield respectively
Ssh =
¡
1¡ (1 + Á) e¡Á¢ (»H + (1¡ »)L ¡ h) ; (3)
Ssl = Áe
¡Áh+
¡
1¡ (1 + Á) e¡Á¢ (»H + (1¡ »)L) : (4)
2.2 Intermediated market
In the intermediated market, competitive middlemen pairwise match buyers and sell-
ers. For simplicity, we assume that middlemen face zero costs in operating intermedi-
ation, so that the ?intermediation fee? is zero and the bid and ask prices boil down to a
single market price pm. The price pm is determined by the market clearing condition;
i.e. pm is the price that induces an equal number of buyers and sellers to enter the
middleman market.
4For a detailed derivation, see e.g. Lu and McAfee (1996).
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Since agents trade with certainty and since buyers rationally expect that there will
only be lemons for sale, the expected utilities for buyers and sellers obtain respectively
Bm = L ¡ pm; (5)
Sm = pm: (6)
2.3 Equilibrium analysis
Market clearing in the middleman market implies that also the number of buyers and
sellers in the search market must equal; i.e. x = y so that Á = 1. Moreover, mixed
strategies require that Sm = Ssl and B
m = Bs, which with Á = 1 yield
pm =
h
e
+
µ
1¡ 2
e
¶
(»H + (1¡ »)L) ; (7)
L ¡ pm = (»H + (1¡ »)L ¡ h)
e
: (8)
Using (7) and (8), the two endogenous equilibrium variables, the price p¤m and
the proportion of high quality sellers in the search market »¤5, are given by
p¤m =
e ¡ 2
e ¡ 1L ¡
h
e
and »¤ =
L
(e ¡ 1) (H ¡ L) : (9)
In order for the pair fp¤m; »¤g to establish an equilibrium, it must hold that each
trader earns non-negative rents. Since Ssl > S
s
h, the relevant individual rationality
conditions are Ssh ¸ 0 and Bs = Bm ¸ 0. Both of these conditions are satis?ed if
»¤ ¸ h
H ¡ L , L ¸
e ¡ 1
e
h ´ ¹Lss:
If L ¸ ¹Lss, a su¢cient separation will occur; i.e. a su¢ciently large fraction of
the low quality sellers chooses to trade in the intermediated market, so that a market
failure in the search market can be avoided. The intuition is that the transferable rent
L ¡ l = L has to be su¢ciently large in order to have enough demand for lemons in
the intermediated market.
A full separation requires that Sm > Ssl , so that »
¤ = 1. Sm > Ssl holds if
L ¸ e ¡ 1
e
H ´ ¹Lfs: (10)
5Note that »¤ determines the equilibrium price p¤¸2, as well as the equilibrium probabilities a
¤
and b¤ with which the low quality sellers and buyers choose the search market.
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The condition L ¸ ¹Lfs can be consistent with the ranking L < h if h > [(e ¡ 1) =e]H.
In other words, the transferable rent H ¡ h available in the search market under
full separation has to be low enough to secure su¢cient demand for ?lemons? in the
intermediated markets.
3 Dynamic extension
Assume now an in?nite horizon economy, where the unmatched agents face unlimited
possibilities to trade in the future. The agents discount future cash ?ows with the
common discount factor ± < 1. The value of remaining unmatched in the search market
is ±Bsfor a buyer and ±Ssh (±S
s
l ) for a high (low) quality seller. In the transaction, the
loss of this value has to be compensated. This means that p1 must equal h+ ±Ssh and
p¸2 satis?es »H + (1¡ »)L ¡ p¸2 = ±Bs, so that the life time utilities available in the
search market obtain6
Bs = e¡Á (»H + (1¡ »)L ¡ h ¡ ±Ssh) +
¡
1¡ e¡Á¢ ±Bs;
Ssh = e
¡Á±Ssh + Áe
¡Á±Ssh +
¡
1¡ (1 + Á) e¡Á¢ (»H + (1¡ »)L ¡ h ¡ ±Bs) ;
Ssl = e
¡Á±Ssl + Áe
¡Á (±Ssh + h) +
¡
1¡ (1 + Á) e¡Á¢ (»H + (1¡ »)L ¡ ±Bs) :
A steady state requires that the number of agents who transact and exit equals
the number of newborn agents. Since the number of unmatched buyers and sellers
from the previous period must be the same and since the number of new buyers and
sellers equals by assumption, market clearing in the middleman market again implies
that the steady state ratio between buyers and sellers in the search market must equal
unity; i.e. Á = 1. Thus,
Bs =
1
e ¡ ± (»H + (1¡ »)L ¡ h) ; (11)
Ssh =
e ¡ 2
e ¡ ± (»H + (1¡ »)L ¡ h) ; (12)
Ssl =
e ¡ 2
e ¡ ± (»H + (1¡ »)L) +
h
e ¡ ± : (13)
Since the life time utilities available in the middleman market are still given by
(5) and (6), the indi¤erence conditions Sm = Ssl and B
m = Bs imply
p¤m =
e ¡ 2
e ¡ 1L ¡
h
e ¡ ± and »
¤ =
(1¡ ±)L
(e ¡ 1) (H ¡ L) ;
6It is easy to check that these equations equal eq. (2)-(4) with ± = 0.
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so that
¹Lss =
e ¡ 1
e ¡ ±h and
¹Lfs =
e ¡ 1
e ¡ ±h:
¹Lss and ¹Lfs are both increasing in ±. Higher ± means that the agents have
greater valuation for future trading opportunities, so that the value loss resulting
from the potential inability to transact in the search market is reduced. As a result,
the search market becomes a more attractive option also for the low quality sellers.
Greater patience thus limits the range of parameter values within which a steady state
equilibrium with su¢cient separation exists - an observation that contradicts with the
commonly held view (e.g. Janssen and Roy, 2002; Blouin, 2003) that a dynamic
perspective is likely to mitigate the lemons? problem.
However, since the high quality sellers trade on average less frequently than the
low quality sellers, their steady state share, say ¤, among all sellers is greater than in
the static case. ¤ can be shown to yield7
¤ =
e»¤¸
(e ¡ 1) »¤ + ¸ > ¸:
If this number is su¢ciently large, the lemon?s problem might not emerge even though
the su¢cient separation induced by the trading via middlemen would not be feasible.
Appendix
Let Y denote the steady state ?stock? of sellers in the search market. Since the number
of sellers trading in the middleman market equals (1 ¡ a)(1 ¡ ¸) in each period, we
have
¤ =
»¤Y
Y + (1¡ a)(1¡ ¸) ;
Steady state requires that the ?in?ow? and ?out?ow? of each seller type must balance
in the search market, i.e., given that Á mus equal unity,
e ¡ 1
e
»¤Y = ¸ and
e ¡ 1
e
(1¡ »¤)Y = a(1¡ ¸):
These steady state conditions directly imply
Y =
e¸
(e ¡ 1) »¤ and a =
¸
1¡ ¸
1¡ »¤
»¤
;
so that
¤ =
e»¤¸
(e ¡ 1) »¤ + ¸:
7See Appendix for detailed derivation.
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